Damien and John Keown claim that there is important common ground between Buddhism and Christianity on the issue ofeuthanasia and that both traditions oppose it for similar reasons in order to espouse a "sanctity oflife" position. I argue that the appearance ofconsensus is partly created by theirfailure to specify clearly enough certain key notions in the argument: particularly Buddhism, euthanasia and the sanctity of life. Once this is done, the Keowns' central claims can be seen to be eitherfalse or only restrictedly true.
Introduction
Damien and John Keown claim that there is important common ground between Buddhism and Christianity on the issue of euthanasia and that both traditions oppose it for similar reasons in order to espouse a "sanctity of life" position.' More particularly, they claim that the following five conclusions may be drawn about euthanasia in Buddhism and Christianity. First, that despite their cultural and theological differences, there is a striking similarity in the two religions' opposition to the intentional killing of patients. Second, this opposition derives from their shared rejection of consequentialist reasoning in favour of an ethical approach grounded in a respect for life as a basic as opposed to an instrumental good. Third, notwithstanding their absolute opposition to euthanasia, both religions teach that life is not an absolute value to be preserved at all costs and emphasise the transitoriness of earthly life. Fourth, this consensus challenges prevalent assumptions about the impossibility of moral consensus in the modem world. Fifth The Keowns express concern about the frequent misrepresentation of the doctrine of the sanctity of life. But their own explanation of it is unfortunately not as clear as it might be, for they offer several, apparently logically distinct, formulations of it. These include the following four theses: (1) That as life is a gift from God, it is to be cherished.
(2) All human beings are to be valued, irrespective of age, sex, race, religion, social status or their potential for achievement. ( 3) The deliberate taking of human life is prohibited except in self-defence or the legitimate defence of others. (4) Human life is a basic good as opposed to an instrumental good, a good in itself rather than as a means to an end.5
Obviously these four formulations are not logically equivalent, and the supposed relations of implication between them are unspecified. But presumably for the Keowns, affirming the sanctity of life doctrine at least involves affirming one or more of (1)-(4). The Keowns quickly acknowledge that (1) would be denied by Buddhism as a corollary of its denial of a creator God. Instead, Buddhism's purported belief in the sanctity of life "is grounded not in its divine origin but in its spiritual destiny, namely Finally, the nature of the Theravada texts that are utilised by the Keowns needs to be understood.
They rely on the Vinayapi(aka, the case books of monastic discipline. However, rather than enunciating general principles from which particular judgments can be derived, the Vinaya prefers extensive listing of individual cases and the Buddha's reported judgment thereon, often making it difficult to see what the ratio of the particular judgment might be. Moreover it is important to realise that the cases involve breaches of monastic discipline. Thus Traditional Japanese attitudes to the nonvoluntary euthanasia of infants are also quite permissive. Midwives would not assume that a new-born baby should live, but would ask if the infant was "to be left" or "to be returned". Defective infants were regularly subject to "thinning" (mabiki).`4 Just as a tolerance for, and ritualisation of, abortion evolved in Japanese Buddhism,'5 so too did a tolerance for, and ritualisation of, euthanasia under certain circumstances.
Tibetan Buddhism seems rather less tolerant of abortion.'6 However, the Dalai Lama himself has indicated that euthanasia may sometimes be permissible: "In the event a person is definitely going to die and he is either in great pain or has virtually become a vegetable, and prolonging his existence is only going to cause difficulties and suffering for others, the termination of his life may be permitted according to Mahayana Buddhist ethics"."' And the late Kalu Rinpoche, a very senior Kagyu lama, said clearly both that persons who are terminally ill and decide to take themselves off life-support perform a "karmically neutral act", and that assisting a dying person who asks us to remove life-support is also karmically neutral, provided our basic motivation is to relieve the patient's suffering. ' Thus we can find even canonical Theravadin texts which affirm that whatever action, bodily, verbal, or mental, leads to suffering for oneself, for others or for both, that action is bad; while whatever action, bodily, verbal, or mental, does not lead to suffering for oneself, for others or for both, that action is good.23 Accordingly Buddhism does not value human life as an intrinsic good. It is true that the extreme rarity and preciousness of a human birth is often emphasised in Buddhism, especially in the Tibetan tradition. But the preciousness of a human birth is because only as a human is it possible to practise the dharma successfully and achieve the goal of the elimination of suffering, ie nirvana.24
Nor does Buddhism affirm anything significantly like the Christian doctrine of the sanctity of life. Consider again theses (1)- (4) above, which the Keowns themselves offer as glosses of the doctrine. Buddhism actually denies both (1) and (2). (3) is too narrow as a formulation of the traditional sanctity of life doctrine, and anyway (as we have seen) there are Buddhist exceptions to it. Since (2) does not indicate how much every human is to be valued, it is so weak a formulation of the doctrine of the sanctity of life as to be inoffensive not only to the Buddhist, but even to the dreaded utilitarian bioethicist, who also, after all, opposes wanton killing.
Consider instead the following thesis which seems to capture better an important part of the traditional Christian understanding of the sanctity of life doctrine and its resistance to quality of life tradeoffs: 
